Erdem Lamazhapov

PhD Research Fellow, FNI, Norway

Visiting at: Tongji University
Period: 1 month
Research Theme: China’s Arctic policy and its reception by the Arctic states

Introduction

Since the People’s Republic of China became interested in the Arctic, numerous studies have explored different facets of China’s Arctic policy-making. Initially, studies have focused on big lines in Chinese foreign policy, including the national interests. However, recent analyses have provided a more nuanced view to analyze actors’ perceptions, including academia, businesses, local governments, as influential as well. Analysis of non-traditional actors can be increasingly important and interesting for understanding China’s foreign policy, including the Arctic policy.

In terms of empirical contributions, various scholars have investigated China's rise and its foreign policy strategies through its Arctic involvement. Thanks to the support from CNARC fellowship, I had a chance to stay at Tongji University Center for Polar and Ocean Studies in Shanghai in April 2025. During this short stay, I had opportunities to communicate with the academic community, conducted fieldwork, including 20 semi-structured interviews with academics and expert and collected literature on the Arctic in Chinese.

For the majority of the fellowship period, I stayed at the Tongji University, where I had an opportunity to communicate with the scholars working on the Arctic and Antarctic. During the visit, I also had the opportunity to visit the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Fudan University, East China Normal University, the Ocean University of China, as well as Wuhan University. During my stay, I held a lecture for graduate students at Fudan University on Russo-Chinese relations in the Arctic, as well as made presentations at Ocean University of China and Wuhan University.

Erdem speaking

 

China's Arctic Politics and Defining China's Arctic Policy

Having conducted fieldwork and read publications on China’s Arctic policy have given me insights about the foreign policy process. Chinese discourse on Arctic policy seeks to find a dialectical balance between two viewpoints: that China will not exceed its boundaries as a non-Arctic state while also striving to remain engaged and present in Arctic matters. This dual perspective reflects China’s broader foreign policy approach and culture, where dialectics is a unique feature of Chinese philosophy. Chinese dialectical thought emphasizes the importance of contradictions and the concept of complementarity, as articulated through dialectical thinking. This philosophical lens informs not only China's general foreign policy but also its approach to Arctic engagement.

Chinese academics often name familiar themes in Arctic geopolitics, such as the tensions between economic development and environmental protection, and the differing roles of Arctic and non-Arctic states. The Arctic is a strategic interest for China, though not a core one, and integrates Arctic issues with its comprehensive foreign policy objectives. The 2018 White Paper on China’s Arctic policy exemplifies the dialectical balances, expressing respect for the sovereignty of Arctic states, as well as China’s interests in Arctic affairs.

Erdem in Wuhan

 

Organized Interests and China’s Arctic Policy Making

Roughly speaking, China’s primary interests in the Arctic revolve around scientific research, shipping routes, natural resources, climate change, and governance participation. Scientific research serves as a foundational interest, underpinning China’s role as an observer in the Arctic Council and supporting its governance ambitions. Shipping routes, especially the Northern Sea Route, are prioritized due to their potential to shorten trade between China and Europe, despite current operational challenges and geopolitical complexities. Economic interests focus on resource development, although China recognizes the high costs and sovereignty constraints limiting direct exploitation. Climate change is viewed as a critical concern due to its significant environmental impact on China, such as extreme weather events linked to Arctic warming.

China has invested heavily in polar scientific expeditions, particularly in the Antarctic, where it has established various research stations and conducts independent research. In contrast, Arctic research is more constrained by logistics, geopolitical sensitivities, and reliance on cooperation with Arctic states. Chinese polar scientists face challenges including limited fieldwork duration, data sharing restrictions, and harsh environmental conditions. Scientific cooperation is pursued as a means to enhance understanding and foster peaceful engagement, with platforms such as CNARC facilitating exchanges.

The opening of Arctic shipping routes due to climate change is a strategic economic interest for China. However, operational use is limited by ice conditions, infrastructure deficits, and the need for cooperation with Arctic states, particularly Russia, which controls the Northern Sea Route. China’s developed shipbuilding industry positions it to contribute vessels capable of Arctic navigation, but geopolitical tensions and market uncertainties temper expectations. The Polar Silk Road remains largely a future-oriented agenda without concrete large-scale projects, with current activities like the Yamal LNG project representing the main tangible cooperation between China and Russia in the region.

As an observer in the Arctic Council, China seeks to participate actively in Arctic governance despite challenges that arise as a result of being a non-Arctic state. It aspires to cooperate with Arctic states to influence regional developments, emphasizing peaceful cooperation, respect for sovereignty, and sustainable development. The concept of China as a “near-Arctic state” is recognized internally as a geographic reality but is contested internationally. China’s governance role is supported by academic research and policy analysis, which inform government reports and white papers. The policymaking process involves multiple institutions, with some degree of coordination between academia, business and policymaking.

The relationship between China and Russia in the Arctic is characterized by pragmatic cooperation amid geopolitical pressure from Western countries. Certain areas of cooperation are largely symbolic, aimed at signaling partnership and deterrence rather than indicating a deep military alliance in the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic is considered its strategic backyard, leading to cautious engagement with China, whose interests are seen as complementary but not fully aligned. Economic cooperation is stable but limited by Russia’s protectionist tendencies and sanctions.

China’s Arctic engagement faces logistical challenges, including limited icebreaking capabilities, short fieldwork seasons, and data gaps. Geopolitical tensions and the securitization of Arctic issues complicate cooperation with Western Arctic states. Funding competition and institutional coordination also present hurdles within China’s research community. Despite these challenges, China continues to expand its scientific presence and seeks to balance its Arctic ambitions with broader foreign policy goals, including maintaining stability in China-Russia relations and navigating great power competition. The Arctic’s importance is expected to grow, particularly as climate change accelerates and geopolitical interests intensify.

Erdem in a library

Erdem huadong